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THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE RELIGION
CLAUSES: 1982 AND
1984 TERMS
DONALD H. J. HERMAN*
A. CASES DECIDED By THE SUPREME COURT IN THE
1982 AND 1983 TERMS.
During the 1982-83 terms, the United States Supreme Court has con-
sidered cases involving religion which have required it principally to con-
sider the Establishment Clause. I will briefly report on the cases that
have been decided and that are pending. Most of this discussion, how-
ever, will deal with two cases, Marsh v. Chambers,' decided in 1983, in
which the Court upheld the practice of paid legislative chaplains, and
Lynch v. Donnelly,2 decided in 1984, in which the Court upheld the prac-
tice of publicly supported creche displays. The principal focus of my dis-
cussion will be on their implications for civil religion or what Justice
Brennan calls "ceremonial deism."
In the 1982 term, the Court decided three cases which dealt with
church-state issues. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den,3 the Court found as a
general matter that religious institutions must be excluded from govern-
mental decision making. Grendel's Den, a restaurant, challenged the con-
stitutionality of a Massachusetts state law that gave churches and schools
the power to veto the liquor license of any business within a 500-foot
radius of their premises. The restaurant had been denied a liquor license
because of the opposition of a nearby church. In an 8-1 decision, Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the Court, found that the vesting of govern-
* Judicial Fellow of the United States Courts; Professor of Law and Professor of Philoso-
phy, DePaul University. Professor Hermann serves on the Board of Directors of the Center
for Church-State Studies in Chicago.
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
2 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
3 459 U.S. 116 (1983).
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mental power in religious institutions violated the establishment clause's
''core rationale" of "preventing a fusion of governmental and religious
functions." Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion, criticized the ma-
jority for indicating the acceptability of a flat ban on all liquor licenses
within a prescribed radius of churches, while striking down the state stat-
ute's less restrictive, discretionary ban. In Justice Rehnquist's view, if the
more rigid prohibition would be constitutional, the more flexible one
must also survive constitutional scrutiny.
In Marsh v. Chambers, a member of the Nebraska state legislature
challenged the custom of opening the legislative day with a prayer by an
official chaplain. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held this practice
did not violate the establishment clause. An extensive analysis of this
case will be presented in the principal part of my presentation.
In Mueller v. Allen" a challenge was made to a Minnesota statute
allowing taxpayers to deduct tuition, transportation, instructional mate-
rial, and textbook expenses incurred in educating dependents attending
primary and secondary schools. In a 5-4 decision, the Court found that
the statute was neutral on its face and in its application and did not have
a primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion. Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the majority, focused on several features of the Minne-
sota statute that distinguished the tax law from similar measures previ-
ously found to be unconstitutional. First, unlike the arrangements that
had been ruled unconstitutional, the statute at issue was only one among
many deductions, and was made available to all parents, including those
whose children attend public schools and those whose children attend
non-sectarian private schools, as well as sectarian private schools. Second,
it was noted that all but one of the recent cases invalidating state aid to
parochial schools had involved state assistance given directly to the
schools themselves, while the Minnesota aid went to individual parents.
Thus, instead of providing a tax benefit, a form of aid previously held
unconstitutional, the Minnesota system involved a genuine tax deduction.
In his dissent, Justice Marshall rejected the majority's attempt to distin-
guish cases that had held similar measures unconstitutional. The dissent
stressed the actual effect of the tax deduction rather than the statute's
apparent neutrality, focusing on evidence that shows that virtually all of
the tax benefits authorized by the statute went to parents of parochial
school children.
So far in the 1983 term, the court has decided one major case involv-
ing church and state. This is Lynch v. Donnelly which held that, notwith-
standing the religious significance of a creche, a public supported display
of a nativity scene as part of a holiday display did not violate the Estab-
- 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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lishment Clause. This case will also receive major attention in the princi-
pal part of my presentation.
B. CASES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT
Three cases involving church and state are presently pending before
the Court. In Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,5 the District Court
held that the city school district's shared time community education pro-
gram, in which it supplies public school teachers to teach courses from its
general curriculum in private school facilities leased from these schools,
violates the Establishment Clause. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. The Court is faced with the question of whether provision of
secular, supplementary, non-substitutionary, instructional services to
part-time public school students on premises leased from religiously ori-
ented non-public schools under conditions of public school control consti-
tutes a per se violation of the Establishment Clause. The case is compli-
cated by the issue of state taxpayer standing.
In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,6 the Court is presented with
the question of whether a Connecticut statute that protects persons who
are involved in religious practices against being compelled to work on the
day of the week which they observe as their Sabbath violates the First
Amendment Establishment Clause.
In the consolidated cases of Wallace v. Jaffree7 and Smith v. Jaf-
free,8 the Court has agreed to consider two questions:
(1) Whether a state statute which permits, but does not require,
teachers in public schools to observe up to a minute of non-activ-
ity for meditation or silent prayer has the predominant effect of
advancing the student's liberty of mind rather than any effect of
establishing religion; and
(2) Does a moment of silence for individual silent prayer and medita-
tior, at the beginning of each school day in a public school class-
room violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as
interpreted by its language, framers' intent, and history?
I now turn to the principal part of my presentation, which will deal
with the opinions of the Court handed down in the last two terms which
relate to the recognition of civil religion.
- 105 S.Ct. 3216 (1985).
6 105 S.Ct. 2914 (1985).
105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985).
8 469 U.S. 1102 (1985).
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C. A RELIGIOUS PEOPLE AND A CHRISTIAN NATION: CONSTRUING THE
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Just before the turn of the century, the United States Supreme Court
could in a unanimous opinion declare without qualification that: "[T]his
is a Christian nation." This assertion was made in the case of the Church
of the Holy Trinity v. United States decided in 1892.' This case involved
an action brought against a New York church which had contracted for
the services of a minister residing in England; the action charged viola-
tion of an anti-immigration statute prohibiting any person or organization
from assisting or encouraging migration of any foreigner to perform labor
or service in any part of the United States. The Supreme Court reversed
lower court findings that this particular contract violated the statute. In
reaching its conclusion, the Court found that it was not the intention of
Congress to forbid such contracts for services of ministers or ecclesiastical
employees who were residents of a foreign nation. In determining the pur-
pose of Congress, the Court assumed that there was an affirmative histor-
ical relation of the American state to religion and in particular to Chris-
tian churches.
The Court found that it was unlikely the Congress meant in any way
to impede the activity of Christian churches "because this is a religious
people." The Court considered a variety of historical experiences as es-
tablishing this fact, including the royal commission of Christopher Co-
lumbus, the first colonial grant to Sir Walter Raleigh by Queen Elizabeth,
the first charter of Virginia granted by King James I, the Maryland Com-
pact, the fundamental orders of Connecticut, and the charter granted to
William Penn. All of these were found by the Court to have been granted
to further the Christian faith.
The Court then turned to a consideration of the attitude of the
American federal and state governments to the policy of furtherance of
religion from the time of independence. The Court observed that "the
Declaration of Independence recognizes the presence of the Divine in
human affairs, by the very explicit terms of the document itself." Further,
the Court noted: "If we examine the constitutions of the various [sitates,
we find in them a constant recognition of religious obligations. Every con-
stitution of every one of the forty-four [s]tates contains language which
either directly or by clear implication recognizes a profound reverence for
religion and an 'assumption that its influence in all human affairs is essen-
tial to the well-being of the community." The Court went on to find that
the Constitution with the First Amendment free exercise clause consti-
tutes a declaration of support for religion which continues the tradition
embodied in the state constitutions. The Court concluded: "There is no
9 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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dissonance in these declarations. There is a universal language pervading
them all, having one meaning; they affirm and reaffirm one meaning; they
affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation. These are not individual
sayings, declarations of private persons: they are organic utterances; they
speak the voice of the entire people."
Satisfied that it established that by tradition "this is a religious na-
tion," the Court turned to the consideration of the specific religious char-
acter of the nation. The Court began by quoting from various state court
opinions to establish its assertion that "this is a Christian nation." First
the Court cited a Pennsylvania opinion which states: "Christianity, gen-
eral Christianity, is, and always has been, a part of the common law of
Pennsylvania; . ..not Christianity with an established church .. .and
spiritual courts; but Christianity with liberty of conscience to all men."'"
The Court then turned to an opinion of Chancellor Kent written
when he served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New York
where he wrote: "The people of this [s]tate, in common with the people of
this country, profess the general doctrines of Christianity, as the rule of
their faith and practice; ... the case assumes that we are a Christian
people, and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted upon Christi-
anity. . .. "I Turning from case law to general practice, the Court found
evidence to support its assertion; the Court cited the form of oaths which
include an appeal to the Almighty, the custom of opening sessions of de-
liberative bodies with prayer, laws respecting observance of the Sabbath.
The Court concluded that: "These, and many other matters which might
be noticed, add a volume of unofficial declarations to the mass of organic
utterances that this is a Christian nation."
D. FORBIDDING SCHOOL PRAYER AND BIBLE READING: CONSTRUING THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The decision in Church of the Holy Trinity can properly read to pro-
vide that the statute at issue could not be applied to prohibit the hiring
of a foreign cleric without violating the free exercise clause. The Court
found as a general proposition that we are a religious people, and as a
matter of a more specific proposition that we are a Christian nation; and
that to prevent activity which was germane to the functioning of a Chris-
tian Church would involve an unconstitutional interference. With the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court in Engel v. Vitale"2 finding that the re-
quired recitation of an official state prayer in schools violated the First
10 Id. at 470 (quoting Updegraph v. Com., 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 400).
11 Id. at 470-71 (quoting People v. Ruzzles, 8 Johns 290, 294-295).
12 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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Amendment, and the decision in Abington School District v. Schempp's
finding that a requirement of reading of passages from the Bible or the
Lord's Prayer in public schools violates the First Amendment, the Court
construed the effect of the establishment clause on officially required
non-denominational religious activity and specifically, non-sectarian
Christian activity. Without denying that we are a religious people, the
Court in Engel v. Vitale found that: "[n]either the fact that the prayer
may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the
part of students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of
the Establishment Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause
• . . In Abington School District v. Schempp, the Court again found
that the "religious character of the exercise" of reading at the opening of
the school day of verses from the Holy Bible and the recitation of the
Lord's Prayer by students in unison to be in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan identified as a par-
ticular basis for constitutional prohibition the Christian character of the
exercises which made these exercises objectionable at the present time in
a way which they might not have been to the framers of the Constitution.
Justice Brennan reasoned: "[O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly
more diverse people than were our forefathers. They knew differences
chiefly among Protestant sects. Today the Nation is far more heterogene-
ous religiously, including as it does substantial minorities not only of
Catholics and Jews but as well of those who worship according to no ver-
sion of the Bible and those who worship no God at all. In the face of such
profound changes, practices which may have been objectionable to no one
in the time of Jefferson and Madison may today be highly offensive to
many persons, the deeply devout and the nonbelievers alike.' 5
Legislative Prayer and Civil Religion
The recent decisions of the Supreme Court in Marsh and Lynch raise
the question of whether religious practices can occur within a governmen-
tal context without offending the deeply devout who may view such prac-
tices as constituting the establishment of a secular religion or the nonbe-
liever who may see such practices as an endorsement of religious, or, more
specifically, Christian belief. In Marsh v. Chambers,'" the Court found
that the practice of the Nebraska legislature of opening its legislative day
with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment. The majority observed that for
13 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
" 370 U.S. at 430.
" 374 U.S. at 240-241 (Brennan, J., concurring).
'a 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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sixteen years the chaplain had been elected from one Christian denomi-
nation, the Presbyterian Church, that he was paid at public expense, and
that the prayers offered were in the Judeo-Christian tradition.
The majority found the practice of opening sessions of a legislature
and other deliberative public bodies with prayer was deeply embedded in
the history and tradition of the country. It was noted that court proceed-
ings, including those in the United States Supreme Court, begin with an
announcement including the invocation: "God save the United States and
this Honorable Court." The majority traced the practice of opening legis-
lative meetings with prayer by a paid chaplain to the Continental Con-
gress, and observed that this practice was carried on by the First Con-
gress in 1789 by statute. The Bill of Rights, including the First
Amendment with its Establishment Clause, which was argued as the basis
for constitutional attack on the practices at issue in Marsh, was agreed to
only three days after Congress authorized the appointment of paid chap-
lains. Thus, the majority concluded: "Clearly the men who wrote the First
Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid legislative chaplains and
opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment, for the practice of
opening sessions with prayer has continued without interruption ever
since that early session of Congress.' ' 7
The Marsh majority, while conceding that "[s]tanding alone, histori-
cal patterns cannot justify contemporary'violations of constitutional guar-
antees" nevertheless maintained that there was "far more here than sim-
ply historical patterns" which justified the practice of legislative prayer.
For the majority it was not simply a matter of historical pattern; rather
the majority focused on the historical fact that in the same week mem-
bers of the First Congress voted to appoint and to pay a chaplain for each
House. They also voted to approve the draft of the First Amendment for
submission to the states. From this fact two inferences were drawn: first,
that the drafters could not reasonably be viewed as intending the Estab-
lishment Clause to forbid that which they had immediately before found
acceptable; and second, that it would be incongruous to interpret the
Clause as imposing more stringent constitutional limitations on the states
than the draftsmen imposed on the federal government.
The majority went on to reject the argument that opening the legisla-
ture with prayer should be viewed as proselytizing activity or as symboli-
cally placing the government's official seal of approval on a particular re-
ligious view. Rather, the majority viewed these invocations in the
legislature as simply harmonizing with the tenets of some or all religions,
while avoiding the objection of school prayer since the individuals af-
fected by the practice of legislative prayer are adults and presumably not
" Id. at 788.
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susceptible to religious indoctrination nor subject to peer pressure. The
majority found no concern with the content of the prayer since there was
no indication that the prayer was used as an opportunity to proselytize or
advance any particular religion or belief. Instead the majority endorsed
the observation that "[wie are a religious people whose institutions pre-
suppose a Supreme Being," and held that "[iln light of the unambiguous
and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt that
the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of
the fabric of our society. To invoke Divine guidance on a public body
entrusted with making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an estab-
lishment of religion or a step toward establishment; it is simply a tolera-
ble acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this
country." 8
It is clear that the majority based its finding of constitutionality of
legislative prayer upon acceptance of the proposition that these widely
held religious beliefs establish that we are a Judeo-Christian nation since
the court specifically found that the practice at issue in the Nebraska
legislature involved prayers that were in the "Judeo-Christian tradition."
In a footnote quoting the deposition of the chaplain involved in the case,
it was noted that the prayers could be characterized as "non-sectarian,"
"Judeo-Christian" with "elements of the American civil religion." 19
In a lengthy dissent by Justice Brennan who was joined by Justice
Marshall, it was argued that the practice of invocational prayer violated
the Establishment Clause and was not saved by historical pattern or fact.
According to Justice Brennan, for a statute providing for some religious
practice to survive constitutional challenge, it must have a secular pur-
pose; its principal or primary effect can be neither to advance nor to in-
hibit religion; and it cannot foster an intensive government entanglement
with religion. Justice Brennan applied these tests to legislative prayer and
found it to fail each. The purpose of legislative prayer was viewed to be
self evident; it was found to be primarily religious rather than secular.
According to the dissent: "To invoke Divine guidance on a public body
entrusted with making the laws, is nothing but a religious act." Whatever
secular functions legislative prayer might perform, the dissent cited the
formality of opening a session, getting the membership to quiet down,
imbuing legislators with a sense of high purpose and seriousness, were
said to be obtainable without a religious practice. Justice Brennan went
on to observe "that to claim a secular purpose for prayer is an insult to
the perfectly honorable individuals who instituted and continue the
practice."
I8 ld. at 792 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 793 n.14.
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Not only the purpose but also the primary effect, according to the
dissent, of legislative prayer is religious. The dissent saw no significant
difference between school prayer and legislative prayer since they both
place indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to
the prevailing officially approved religion. Justice Brennan underscored
his observation: "[Ilnvocation in Nebraska's legislative halls explicitly
link religious belief and observance to the power and prestige of the
State. [T]he mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority
by Church and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to reli-
gion. . . ." Equally objectionable to the dissent was the fact that the
practice of legislative prayerleads to excessive entanglement of the state
and religion. Specifically, the dissent noted that: "In the case of legisla-
tive prayer, the process of choosing a suitable chaplain, whether on a per-
manent or rotating basis, and insuring that the chaplain limits himself or
herself to suitable prayers, involves precisely the sort of supervision that
agencies of government should if at all possible avoid." This entangle-
ment was further viewed as threatening political division along religious
lines producing rancor and conflict which the First Amendment was
aimed at avoiding. For instance, the dissent observed such divisiveness
reflected in "objections raised by some Senators to Christological refer-
ences in certain prayers" made by the chaplain and guest members of the
clergy.20
Justice Brennan then explored the nature of the relationship between
the state and religion which he maintained was required by the Constitu-
tion. The terms "separation" and "neutrality" were viewed as producing
"a wall of separation between church and state." Not a metaphor, but an
actual barrier. The result, according to the dissent, is a continuing need
to reaffirm the proposition that: "The Establishment Clause embodies a
judgment, born of a long and turbulent history, that, in our society, reli-
gion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the insti-
tutions of private choice."21 Individual liberty was said to be central to
the First Amendment in the sense of forbidding coercion to religious be-
lief or practice or compelling support for the practices of any faith to
which one does not adhere. Beyond this, Justice Brennan identified three
concerns which must be addressed by anyone who would authorize and
make official religious practice whether it be in terms of recognizing a
"Judeo-Christian practice" or of instituting some form of civil religious
practice. These concerns, according to, the dissent, are born out of a re-
spect for religion and a desire to maintain its character and to prevent its
debasement. A primary purpose of separation and neutrality, according to
"0 Id. at 800 n. 9.
" Id. at 802.
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the dissent, is to keep the state from interfering in the essential auton-
omy of religious life, either by taking upon itself the decision of religious
issues, or by unduly involving itself in the supervision of religion.22 This
concern seems to be an extenuated practice of a traditional religion or
institutes some civil religious practice which draws on a traditional
religion.
Justice Brennan then addressed the historical account given by the
majority. The dissent noted that even before adoption of the First
Amendment, the framers of the Constitution broke with the practice of
the Articles of Confederation and many state constitutions, and did not
involve the name of God in the Constitution. The dissent also rejected
the argument that the framers of the Establishment Clause would not
have authorized chaplains for Congress if they thought it violated the
Clause since according to the dissent, the action in these early Congresses
is equally explained by the passions and exigencies of the time, as well as
the pressure of constituents and colleagues. More importantly, the dissent
objects to the majority's analysis, which was said to treat the First
Amendment as an Act of Congress whose meaning was determined pri-
marily by reference to the intent of Congress; rather, according to the
dissent, the significance of the Bill of Rights is to be determined by the
reference to the purpose of the states which compelled their enactment as
a condition for ratification of the Constitution.2 3
More importantly, Justice Brennan maintained that the fact of the
historical character of a practice does not determine its constitutionality.
According to Justice Brennan: "We have recognized in a wide variety of
constitutional contexts that the practices that were in place at the time
any particular guarantee was enacted into the Constitution do not neces-
sarily fix forever the meaning of that guarantee. '24 The significance of
this fact in the context of church and state was underscored by Justice
Brennan by his reference to one of his earlier opinions where he observed:
"[O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than
were our forefathers . . .[i]n the face of such profound changes, practices
which may have been objectionable to no one in the time of Jefferson and
Madison may today be highly offensive to many persons, the deeply de-
vout and nonbelievers alike." 5
Justice Brennan admits that in the past this may have been a Chris-
tian nation; notwithstanding historical support for such a view, he main-
tains that this country no longer be viewed as such. Justice Brennan
pointed out that in fact President John Adams issued a number of official
"2 Id. at 803.
"3 Id. at 816.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 817 (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240-241 (1963)).
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prayer proclamations. Moreover, Justice Story, in each treatise on the
Constitution, maintained that the "real object" of the First Amendment
"was, not to countenance, much less to advance Mohammedanism, or Ju-
daism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity, but to exclude all rivalry
among Christian sects .... ,26
A possible exemption for certain practices and statements under gov-
ernment auspices was characterized by the dissent as based on a finding
that such "practices" have lost any true religious significance. Among
such practices the dissent would place the familiar recitation of "God
save the United States and this Honorable Court," "In God We Trust,"
"One Nation Under God" and the like. 27 Legislative prayer was viewed as
not falling within this class. According to Justice Brennan:
Prayer is serious business - serious theological business - and it is not a
mere "acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among people of this country"
for the State to immerse itself in that business. Some religious individuals
or groups find it theologically problematic to engage in joint religious exer-
cises predominantly influenced by faiths not their own. Some might object
even to the attempt to fashion a "non-sectarian" prayer. Some would find it
impossible to participate in any "prayer opportunity" marked by Trinita-
rian references. Some would find a prayer not invoking the name of Christ
to represent a flawed view of the relationship between human beings and
God. Some might find any petitionary'prayer to be improper. Some might
find any prayer that lacked a petitionary element to be deficient. Some
might be troubled by what they consider shallow public prayer, or non-
spontaneous prayer, or prayer without adequate spiritual preparation or
concentration. Some might, of course, have theological objections to any
prayer sponsored by an organ of government. Some might object on theolog-
ical grounds to the level of political neutrality generally expected of govern-
ment-sponsored invocational prayer. And some might object on theological
grounds to the Court's requirement that prayer, even though religious, not
be proselytizing.28
The point Justice Brennan seems to be making is that even conced-
ing that we are a "religious nation," this fact does not lead to a ground for
authorizing any particular religious practice because of the profound the-
ological differences that underlie the many sects which constitute our plu-
ralistic religious society. Accordingly, he concludes: "[W]e are faced with
potential religious objections to an activity at the very center of religious
life, and it is simply beyond the competence of government, and inconsis-
tent with our conceptions of liberty, for the [s]tate to take upon itself the
26 Id. at 817 (quoting 1 J. STORY, COMMENTATORS ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1871 (1st ed. 1833).
27 Id. at 817.
2s Id. at 819-21 (footnotes omitted).
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role of ecclesiastical arbiter. 29
F. CIVIL RELIGION AND THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION: "THE CRECHE CASE"
This term the Supreme Court again considered the propriety of gov-
ernmental sponsorship of religious practice, this time an official commem-
oration of Christ's birth. In Lynch v. Donnelly,0 the Court addressed the
question of whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
prohibits a municipality from including a creche, or Nativity scene, in its
annual Christmas display. The Christmas display at issue was erected by
the City of Pawtucket in cooperation with local merchants in a downtown
park owned by a nonprofit organization. The display consisted of many
symbols associated with Christmas, including along with the nativity
scene a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, candy-striped
poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, a clown, an elephant, a teddy bear, hun-
dreds of colored lights, and a large banner which carried the slogan "Sea-
son's Greetings." The creche, which had been exhibited for forty years,
consisted of traditional figures associated with the story of Christ's birth,
including the infant Jesus, Mary, Joseph, angels, shepherds, wise men
and animals.
The District Court found that the exhibition of the creche by the city
represented an endorsement and promulgation of religious beliefs, and
that its erection had the effect of affiliating the city with Christian be-
liefs. The appearance of official sponsorship was found to confer a direct
benefit on Christianity. The First Circuit affirmed.3 2
In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court's opinion
delivered by Chief Justice Burger began with the observation that the
Religion Clauses do not contemplate a total separation of church and
state. The Chief Justice observed that the "concept of a 'wall' of separa-
tion used to describe the relationship of church and state is merely a use-
ful figure of speech;" 3 that the "wall of separation" is a metaphor; and
that this "metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the prac-
tical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and
state." According to Justice Burger, the Constitution, instead, "affirma-
tively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions,
and forbids hostility toward any."
The Court's opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly began by adopting the
analysis developed in Marsh and endorsed that opinion. Justice Burger
2 Id. at 821.
" 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
" 525 F. Supp, 1150 (D. R.I. 1981)
" 691 F. 2d. 1029 (1st Cir. 1982).
3* 465 U.S. at 673.
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underscored the premise that the Establishment Clause is to be inter-
preted in a manner consistent with the contemporaneous understanding
of its significance. Furthermore, according to the Chief Justice: "There is
an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of
government of the role of religion in American life from at least 1789."
This observation led to reaffirmation of the proposition that "we are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." This
proposition was said to be reflected in official prayer invocations, procla-
mation of holidays such as Thanksgiving and Christmas as national holi-
days with religious overtones, adoption of the statutorily prescribed na-
tional motto "In God We Trust," and the language "One Nation Under
God" as part of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag. The Court's opinion
went on to note that art galleries supported by public revenues display
religious paintings which were inspired by the Christian faith. For exam-
ple, the National Gallery in Washington, maintained by federal funds,
exhibits paintings of the Last Supper, the Nativity, the Crucifixion and
the Resurrection. Moreover, the majority observed that the very cham-
bers of the Supreme Court are decorated with a symbol of religion,
namely Moses with the Ten Commandments.
In Lynch v. Donnelly the majority makes explicit what was implicit
in its opinion in Marsh, that is, rejection of the proposition that the test
established in Lemon v. Kurtzman provides a binding standard for the
application of the Establishment Clause. The Court concedes that it is
often useful to inquire whether a challenged law or conduct has a secular
purpose, whether its principal or primary effect is to advance or inhibit
religion, and whether it creates an excessive entanglement with religion.
Nevertheless, the majority observes that: "[W]e have repeatedly empha-
sized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in
this sensitive area," and specifically notes that: "We did not, for example,
consider that analysis relevant in [Marsh]. . . .
The majority emphasizes that the focus of inquiry in the case before
it was "on the creche in the context of Christmas season." Accordingly,
the Court concluded that: "When reviewed in the proper context of the
Christmas holiday season, it is apparent that on this record, there is in-
sufficient evidence to establish that the inclusion of the creche is a pur-
poseful or surreptitious effort to express some kind of subtle governmen-
tal advocacy of a particular religious message." Rather, the Court
maintains that the City of Pawtucket "has principally taken note of a
significant historical religious event long celebrated in the Western
World," and that the "creche in the display depicts the historical origin
I Id. at 674.
33 Id. at 679.
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of this traditional event long recognized as a National Holiday.""0
According to the majority: "The narrow question is whether there is
a secular purpose for Pawtucket's display of the creche. '37 Two purposes
are found: first, to celebrate the holiday, and second, to depict the origins
of the holiday. The majority finds: "These are legitimate secular pur-
poses." The Court compares the benefit to a particular religion by display
of the creche as no more significant than other practices which the court
has upheld despite their benefit to religion; the court cites for comparison
the provision of textbooks for students attending church-sponsored
schools, provision of transportation for such students, grants for building
for church-sponsored colleges, tax exemptions for church properties, and
release time for religious training. The majority concluded: "We are una-
ble to discern a greater aid to religion deriving from inclusion of the
creche than from these benefits and endorsements previously held not vi-
olative of the Establishment Clause."38 The majority concludes that
whatever benefit the creche gives to one faith or religion or all religions, it
is indirect, remote, and incidential; according to the court display of the
creche is not more an advancement or endorsement of religion than the
Congressional and Executive recognition of the origins of the holiday it-
self as "Christ's Mass," or the exhibition of literally hundreds of religious
paintings in governmentally supported museums.
The Court goes on to suggest that the display of the creche is a per-
missible practice of civil religion with identifiable social benefits. The ma-
jority concedes that the creche "is a reminder of the origins of Christ-
mas." According to the Court: "The display engenders a friendly
community spirit of good will in keeping with the season;" further, "the
display brings people into the central city, and serves commercial inter-
ests and benefits merchants and their employees. '39 At the same time, the
Court admits that the "creche may well have special meaning to those
whose faith includes the celebration of religious masses." The majority
maintained that this in no way violates the Establishment Clause; it rea-
soned: "Of course the creche is identified with one religious faith, but
[iut would be ironic, however, if the inclusion of a single symbol of a
particular historic religious event, as part of a celebration acknowledged
in the Western World for 20 centuries, and in this country by the people,
by the Executive Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for two centu-
ries, would so 'taint' the city's exhibit as to render it violative of the Es-
tablishment Clause. To forbid the use of this one passive symbol - the
creche - at the very time people are taking note of the season with Christ-
'e Id. at 680-81.
' Id. at 681.
38 Id. at 682.
38 Id. at 685.
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mas hymns and carols in public schools and other public places, and
while the Congress and legislatures open sessions with prayers by paid
chaplains would be stilted over-reaction to our history, and to our hold-
ings." The Court stated that: "If the presence of the creche in this display
violates the Establishment Clause, a host of other forms of taking official
note of Christmas, and of our religious heritage, are equally offensive to
the Constitution.
40
The majority concludes that the acceptance of certain religious prac-
tices which have a secular purpose, in a sense constituting a civil religion,
in no way violates the Establishment Clause. The Court maintains, "that
the fears and political problems that gave rise to the Religion Clauses in
the 18th century are of far less concern today."' 41 The majority observes:
"We are unable to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Vicar of
Rome, or other powerful religious leaders behind every public acknowl-
edgment of the religious heritage long officially recognized by the three
constitutional branches of government. '42 It is this "public acknowledg-
ment of the religious heritage long officially recognized" which is coming
to constitute the practice of a civil religion. Nevertheless, the Court main-
tains that this is not equivalent to establishing a state church. The Court
maintains: "Any notion that these symbols pose a real danger of estab-
lishment of a state church is far fetched. 43
Justice Brennan, as in Marsh, delivered a strong dissent in Lynch,44
in which he challenged the finding that the display of the creche does not
constitute an endorsement of a religion and goes on to attack the accept-
ance of religious practices derived from traditional faiths as constitution-
ally impermissible. According to Justice Brennan: "Pawtucket's mainte-
nance and display at public expense of a symbol as distinctively sectarian
as a creche simply cannot be squared with our prior cases. And it is
plainly contrary to the purpose and values of the Establishment Clause to
pretend, as the Court does, that the otherwise secular setting of Paw-
tucket's Nativity scene dilutes in some fashion the creche's singular religi-
osity, or that the City's annual display reflects nothing more than an 'ac-
knowledgment' of our shared national heritage."''
Justice Brennan notes that the record shows that the mayor and
other civic leaders of Pawtucket understood that the display of the creche
"would serve the wholly religious purpose of 'keep[ing] Christ in Christ-
40 Id. at 686.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
.4 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 691 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
RELIGION CLAUSES
mas.' "46 He concludes that: "The 'primary effect' of including a Nativity
scene in the city's display is . . . to place the government's imprimatur of
approval on the particular religious beliefs exemplified by the creche...
the City's decision to include the creche as part of its extensive and costly
efforts to celebrate Christmas can only mean that the prestige of the gov-
ernment has been conferred on the beliefs associated with the creche,
thereby providing 'a significant symbolic benefit to religion . . .' ,47
Justice Brennan faults the Court's analysis, which focused on the
holiday context in which the Nativity scene appeared, which, according to
him, attempted to minimize the religious significance of the display. Ac-
cording to Justice Brennan: "The effect of the creche, of course, must be
gauged not only by its inherent religious significance but also by the over-
all setting in which it appears," but according to him: "[I]t blinks reality
to claim, as the Court does, that including such a distinctively religious
object as the creche in its Christmas display, Pawtucket has done no
more than make use of a 'traditional' symbol of the holiday, and has
thereby purged the creche of its religious content and conferred only an
'incidental and indirect' benefit on religion."48 According to Justice Bren-
nan, the creche retains a specifically religious meaning; he states: "I re-
fuse to accept the notion implicit in today's decision that non-Christians
would find that the religious content of the creche is eliminated by the
fact that it appears as part of the City's otherwise secular celebration of
the Christmas holiday. The Nativity scene is clearly distinct in its pur-
pose and effect. . . . It is the chief symbol of the characteristically Chris-
tian belief that a divine Saviour was brought into the world and that the
purpose of this miraculous birth was to illuminate a path toward salva-
tion and redemption.
49
Justice Brennan also criticizes the Court for what he identifies as a
faulty syllogistic argument which he characterizes as follows: "The Court
begins by noting that government may recognize Christmas day as a pub-
lic holiday; the Court then asserts that the creche is nothing more than a
traditional element of Christmas celebration; and it concludes that the
inclusion of a creche is part of a government's annual Christmas celebra-
tion is constitutionally permissible.""
Justice Brennan asserts that this argument fails to take into account
the fact that the Christmas holiday in our national culture contains both
secular and sectarian elements. According to Justice Brennan: [T]he
Court's logic is fundamentally flawed both because it obscures the reason
40 Id. at 700-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 705-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 708 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 709 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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why public designation of Christmas day as a holiday is constitutionally
acceptable, and blurs the distinction between the secular aspects of
Christmas and its distinctly religious character, as exemplified by the
creche."51 The secular aspect of recognition of Christmas as a public holi-
day is said to be in the accommodation of the calendar to a day when
Americans expeet to spend time visiting with their families, attending re-
ligious services, and resting. However, according to the dissent, official
participation in or endorsement of the distinctly religious elements of an
otherwise secular event encroaches upon the First Amendment.
Justice Brennan went on to criticize the characterizations and com-
parisons the Court made as part of the rhetoric of its decision. The
Court's suggestion that the creche is a mere representation of a particular
historic religious event is rejected. And it is maintained that the creche is
"best understood as a mystical re-creation of an event that lies at the
heart of Christian faith."5 2 According to Justice Brennan, the attempted
minimizing of the significance of the creche is insulting both to believers
and to those who believe that the Christian story is no part of our history
or national heritage. Justice Brennan also rejected the majority's analogy
between the display of the creche by a city and the inclusion of the Bible
or Milton's Paradise Lost in a course on English literature by a state
college. According to the dissent, in literature courses "the religiously-
inspired materials are being considered solely as literature. The purpose
is plainly not to single out the particular religious beliefs that may have
inspired the authors, but to see in these writings the outlines of a larger
imaginative universe shared with other forms of literary expression. ' '5 3
Similarly, the dissent rejected the comparison of the city display of a
creche with a museum display of religious art; it is suggested by the dis-
sent that: "It would be another matter if the creche were displayed in a
museum setting, in the company of other religiously-inspired artifacts, as
an example, among many, of the symbolic representation of religious
myths. In that setting, we would have objective guarantees that the
creche could not suggest that a particular faith had been singled out for
public favor and recognition. '54
Finally, Justice Brennan turns to what seems to be the central signif-
icance of the Court's opinion in Marsh and Lynch, that is, the acceptance
of religious practices in a civil religion or what the Court denominates
"official acknowledgment of religion." According to Justice Brennan, the
Court's opinions in these cases sounds "a broader and more troubling
theme." Justice Brennan acknowledges that there are certain practices of
"' Id. at 710 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 711 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53 Id. (Brennan, J., dissneting).
Id. at 713 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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civil religion long accepted. These include: "Invoking the celebration of
Thanksgiving as a public holiday, the legend 'In God We Trust' on our
coins, and the proclamation 'God Save the United States and this Honor-
able Court' at the opening of the judicial sessions." He objects, however,
to the Court's assertion, without explanation, "that Pawtucket's inclusion
of the creche in its annual christmas display poses no more of a threat to
the Establishment Clause values than these other official 'acknowledg-
ments' of religion." 5 Justice Brennan does not so much object to official
acknowledgment of religion or practices of civil religion as he does to the
incorporation of particular practices that seem to refer to a particular set
of religious beliefs. He observes that: "Intuition tells us that some official
'acknowledgment' is inevitable", but that government "must avoid those
overly broad acknowledgments of religious practices that may imply gov-
ernmental favoritism toward one set of religious beliefs." 56 The standard
which the dissent maintains can be derived from the case law which must
be met by the government in recognizing civil religious practice is set out
by Justice Brennan as follows: "Should government choose to incorporate
some arguably religious element into its public ceremonies, that acknowl-
edgment must be impartial; it must not tend to promote one faith or
handicap another; and it should not sponsor religion generally over non-
religion. '57 Application of this standard has resulted in forbidding the
posting of the Ten Commandments in schoolrooms,"5 voiding a prohibi-
tion on teaching principles of Darwinian evolution,59  forbidding
mandatory Bible reading at the beginning of the school day,0 prohibiting
mandatory reading of a state-composed prayer,6 and forbidding use of
public school facilities for religious instructions.e2
Justice Brennan observed that despite a growing body of case law,
"the Court has never comprehensively addressed the extent to which gov-
ernment may acknowledge religion by, for example, incorporating reli-
gious references into public ceremonies and proclamations."63 Neverthe-
less, he suggests that certain principles can be identified which set the
parameters for the acknowledgment of religious practices and for the de-
velopment of civil religion. He notes that although the government may
not be compelled to do so by the Free Exercise Clause, the state may,
consistent with the Establishment Clause, accommodate opportunities for
s Id. at 714 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
69 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
" Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
61 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
63 465 U. at 714 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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individual religious practice. An example would be the proclamation of
Christmas as a holiday by which the government simply chooses to "close
its doors or suspend its operations as to those who want to repair to their
religious sanctuary for worship or instruction.""' Similarly, a practice
which is of both religious and secular significance may be accepted for its
particular secular significance. According to Justice Brennan,
Thanksgiving Day, in his view, "fits easily within this principle, for de-
spite its religious antecedents, the current practice of celebrating
Thanksgiving is unquestionably secular and patriotic. We all gather with
our families on that day to give thanks both for personal and national
good fortune, but we are free, given the secular character of the holiday,
to address that gratitude either to divine beneficence or to such mundane
sources as good luck or the country's abundant natural wealth."' s5
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the dissent is the principle set
out by Justice Brennan for the testing of the propriety of practices of
civil religion; he observes: "[W]e have noted that government cannot be
completely prohibited from recognizing in its public actions the religious
beliefs and practices of the American people as an aspect of our national
history and culture." 6 The examples cited by the dissent are: the desig-
nation of "In God We Trust" as our national motto, and the reference to
God contained in the Pledge of Allegiance. For these practices Justice
Brennan endorses the term "ceremonial deism," which he maintains is
protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny because it involves prac-
tices that have lost through rote repetition any significant religious con-
tent. Particularly significant for Justice Brennan is the secular function
that these practices perform; according to him "these references are
uniquely suited to serve such wholly secular purposes as solemnizing pub-
lic occasions, or inspiring commitment to meet some national challenge in
a manner that simply could not be fully served in our culture if govern-
ment were limited to purely nonreligious phrases.""7 This secular signifi-
cance is drawn from both the historical practice which the Court had
stressed in its opinion, and .their identifiably secular function which the
dissent stresses. According to Justice Brennan: "The practices by which
the government has long acknowledged religion are therefore probably
necessary to serve certain secular functions, and that necessity, coupled
with their long history, gives those practices an essentially secular
meaning."6 8
Notwithstanding his acknowledgment of the propriety of "ceremonial
" Id. 715 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 715-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"6 Id. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 717 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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deism" or civil religion, Justice Brennan finds that the display of the
creche fails to meet the tests he identifies. for proper civil religious prac-
tice. He concludes that the public display of the creche is not necessary to
accommodate individual religious expression, its display is not necessary
to serve wholly secular goals, and that the creche, because of its unique
association with Christianity, is more sectarian than those references to
God that are acceptable in ceremonial phrases and other practices of civil
religion. It is important to see the line that Justice Brennan believes must
be drawn between religious practice which he views as constituting the
prohibited establishment of religion and those which he views as appro-
priate practices of civil religion. He writes: "The religious works on dis-
play at the National Gallery, Presidential references to God during an
Inaugural Address or the national motto represent no risk of establishing
religion. To be sure, our understanding of these expressions may begin in
contemplation of some religious element, but it does not end there. Their
message is dominantly secular. In contrast, the message of the creche be-
gins and ends with reverence for a particular image of the divine. 6 9
Justice Brennan's view of the Court's decision is that it permits in-
corporation into constitutionally permissible civil religion certain prac-
tices which are distinctly Christian. This he finds unconstitutional as a
result of the evolution of the Court's interpretation of the Establishment
Clause. Critically citing Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, Justice
Brennan observes that: "By insisting that such a distinctively sectarian
message [as made by the creche] is merely an unobjectionable part of our
religious heritage, the Court takes a long step backwards to the days
when Justice Brewer could arrogantly declare for the Court that 'this is a
Christian nation.' "0 Justice Brennan suggests that the Court has either
failed to follow its own precedent in Engel v. Vitale, the school prayer
case, or is eroding its precedential value, since in Engel the Court rejected
the argument advanced by the State of New York that its Regent's
Prayer was simply an acceptable part of our "spiritual heritage."7
Justice Brennan concludes his opinion by criticizing the account of
American historical experience of public celebration of Christmas which
is used by the Court as the basis for finding the public display of a creche
constitutionally permissible. While maintaining that an historical practice
standing alone is never sufficient to justify a challenged governmental ac-
tion, he concludes that in fact the historical evidence does not show a
tradition of public display of the creche in the United States until the
nineteenth century. Justice Brennan concludes that: "[T]here is no evi-
, Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 717-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892)).
7 Id. at 718 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962)).
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dence whatsoever that the Framers would have expressly approved a fed-
eral celebration of the Christmas holiday including public displays of a
nativity scene . . . [nior is there any suggestion that publicly-financed
and supported displays of Christmas creches are supported by a record of
widespread, undeviating acceptance that extends throughout our
history. 72
G. CIVIL RELIGION: STATE RELIGION OR EMPTY PRACTICES
The Court's opinions in Marsh and Lynch establish the proposition
that there is no constitutional prohibition against civil religious practices.
These opinions, however, do not establish any general standard by which
one can judge with certainty a practice as appropriate to civil religion.
Two principles seem to emerge from the Court's opinions in these cases:
practices which serve a secular purpose, such as instilling partriotism or
solemnizing proceedings, can be included within civil religion, and sec-
ondly, practices which have been part of the historical and cultural expe-
rience of this nation, even though they have sectarian origins, are permis-
sible to civil religion if they are made to serve secular purposes.
The division of the Court centers on this latter proposition. Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Marsh and Lynch, maintains
that legislative prayer, which in the specific case had been derived from
Judaeo-Christian tradition, and the display of the creche, which is neces-
sarily associated with the Christian religion, are constitutionally permissi-
ble within the practice of civil religion, because they can be shown to
serve secular ends as a result of the context in which the practices occur.
By this reference to the historical experience of this nation for determina-
tion of the propriety of public acknowledgment of religious practices, the
court necessarily must refer to the Christian religious tradition since that
in fact has been the tradition of this country. Chief Justice Burger has
merely provided a formulation one step removed from that of Justice
Brewer in Church of the Holy Trinity. Justice Brewer said "this is a
Christian nation." Chief Justice Burger says that we have an historical
religious tradition to which the Court can refer in making a determina-
tion of the propriety of public religious practices; however, it turns out
that as a matter of historical fact, this tradition is Christian. One must
ask if this mode of analysis does not lead to the very establishment of the
Christian religion which the Constitution was meant to prevent.
On the other hand, the analysis given by Justice Brennan in Marsh
and Lynch leads to the conclusion that for religious practice to be consti-
tutionally permissible as a practice of civil religion, it must be religiously
neutral and wholly secular in purpose. One must ask whether such civil
71 Id. at 724-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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religious practices are not equally offensive to those persons who are reli-
gious and those who are not. This instrumental view of religion would
seem necessarily repugnant to any who worship. To the extent that the
neutrality which would be required to meet Justice Brennan's standards
is possible, it would seem to lead to contentless and meaningless incanta-
tions and exercises. This again would seem to be objectionable to those
who are religious, as well as to persons who would find such expression
hypocritical. While Justice Brennan may be correct in his analysis of
what will pass muster as a constitutionally permissible public religious
practice, as a matter of public policy, the practices and expressions which
would meet his test should perhaps be rejected on the grounds that they
would necessarily be empty and vacuous, and that rather than leading to
patriotism and dedication, they are likely to produce resentment and
cynicism.
